Due Process and Equal Protection: A Constitutional Approach to Same-Sex Marriage by Musselman, Ashley
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 5 
April 2014 
Due Process and Equal Protection: A Constitutional Approach to 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Ashley Musselman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Musselman, Ashley (2014) "Due Process and Equal Protection: A Constitutional Approach to Same-Sex 
Marriage," Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol5/iss1/5 
This Policy Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL 
Journals), published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information, 
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp. 
5:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 71
NOTE
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION: A




On July 6, 2006, the Court of Appeals of New York
decided Hernandez v. Robles.2 At issue in that case was
whether New York's Domestic Relations Law violated the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
New York constitution by limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 3 The plaintiffs were members of forty-four same-
' J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The University of Tennessee College of
Law.
2 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006).
3 Id. at 6. The Hernandez decision was not the first decision to address
the issue of the constitutionality of barring same-sex marriage under
state law. Prior to the Hernandez decision, a number of states had
already ruled on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage restrictions.
In fact, by the time of the Hernandez decision, Arizona, Hawaii,
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont had all been asked to
determine whether laws banning same-sex marriages violated their
state constitutions. Id.
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated and
remanded the Circuit Court's judgment. Hawaii's highest court
declared that "the burden will rest on [the state official] to overcome
the presumption that [the Hawaii statute] is unconstitutional ...."
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
went so far as to recognize that "barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution." Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Vermont, in Baker v. State, held that same-sex couples "may
not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections afforded
1
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sex couples who unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
marriage licenses in the State of New York.4  The case
began as four separate lawsuits in which the plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment against "the license-issuing
authorities of New York City, Albany, and Ithaca; the State
Department of Health, which instructs local authorities
about the issuance of marriage licenses; and the State
itself," for refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, while issuing licenses to opposite-sex couples. 5 In
the end, the Court of Appeals of New York held that "the
New York Constitution does not compel recognition of
marriages between members of the same sex." 6 The court
emphasized that "[w]hether such marriages should be
recognized is a question to be addressed by the
Legislature" 7 and not by the courts.
persons of the opposite sex who choose to marry." Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
The Vermont court, unlike its Massachusetts counterpart,
explicitly left it to the Legislature to determine whether same-sex
couples would be granted such rights under traditional marriage laws or
under a new domestic partnership law. Id. The Court of Appeals of
Indiana held, in Morrison v. Sadler, that "the Indiana Constitution does
not require the governmental recognition of same-sex marriage ...."
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Similarly,
the Arizona Court of Appeals, in Standhardt v. Superior Court, held
that "the fundamental right to marry protected by our federal and state
constitutions does not encompass the right to marry a same-sex
partner." Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. 2003).
Finally, the Superior Court of New Jersey, in Lewis v. Harris, held that
its "statutory limitation of the institution of marriage to members of the
opposite sex does not violate our Constitution." Lewis v. Harris, 875
A.2d 259, 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
4 Id at 5.
5 Id. In the original suits, the Supreme Court of New York granted
summary judgment for the defendant, and the Appellate Division
affirmed the ruling in every case except Hernandez. There the
Supreme Court of New York granted summary judgment for the
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The Hernandez decision is important because laws
affording benefits to married couples are wide-ranging.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) listed family law,
taxation, health care law, probate, torts, government
benefits and programs, private sector benefits, labor law,
real estate, bankruptcy, immigration, and criminal law as
areas where rights and responsibilities are automatically
granted to married couples. 8 Moreover, state and local
governments as well as private organizations provide
hundreds of additional rights based on marital status.
9
Without the ability to marry, same-sex couples are unable
to obtain benefits, which are automatically afforded
opposite-sex couples when they marry. In fact, the GAO
estimates that "[i]f recognition is given to same-sex
marriages . . . more than one thousand rights and
responsibilities of different-sex couples will be extended to
cover couples of the same sex."1  These statistics thus
make it clear that decisions like Hernandez have the
potential to affect every aspect of life for same-sex couples.
In addition, the Hernandez decision is important
because the New York Constitution's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses mirror the language found in the
United States Constitution's versions of those same
Clauses. Because the New York courts have used the same
analytical framework for Due Process as the United States
Supreme Court, the analysis would be the same."
Similarly, the New York Equal Protection Clause is no
broader than that found in the Fourteenth Amendment 2;
thus, this analysis is applicable to the United States
Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
8 American Bar Association Section of Family Law, A White Paper
Analysis of the Laws Regarding Same-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions,
and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 367-70 (2004).
9 Id. at 347-48.
oId. at 347.
11 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9.
12 Id.
3
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Keeping in mind that the analysis of this New York
decision parallels the federal constitutional analysis, this
note will show that the reasoning of the Hernandez
majority is flawed and that the repercussions of this flawed
reasoning are grave. First, I will explain why the
Hernandez majority made an unreasonable argument when
it claimed that the Domestic Relations Law can be
defended as a rational legislative decision. Second, I will
show that the Hernandez majority used an incorrect
standard of review in evaluating the constitutionality of the
Domestic Relations Law by using a rational basis test when
the proper standard for such a case is a strict scrutiny test.
Last, I will demonstrate that by applying the correct
standard of review, the New York Court of Appeals should
have found that the Domestic Relations Law violates the
New York constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.
II. Repercussions of the Hernandez Decision
New York's Domestic Relations Law was adopted
in 1909.13 The law limits marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 14  Specifically, §12 of New York's Domestic
Relations Law states that marriage requires "[n]o particular
form or ceremony . . . but [states that] the parties must
solemnly declare in the presence of a clergy man or
magistrate and the attending witness or witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife."1 5 Section 15(l)(a)
requires that certain duties be performed by the groom and
the bride." Additionally, §50 states that "[p]roperty . . .
owned by a woman at the time of her marriage . .. shall
continue to be her sole and separate property as if she were
"3Id. at6.
1
4 Id. at 1.
15 N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 12 (Consol. 2007) (emphasis added).
16 Id. at §15(1)(a).
4
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unmarried, and shall not be subject to her husband's
control or disposal nor liable for his debts."' 17 As the New
York Court of Appeal noted in the Hernandez decision, it is
clear that the original intent of the law was to limit
marriage to members of the opposite sex.18
The plaintiffs in the Hernandez case claimed that
the Domestic Relations Law violates the New York
constitution's Due Process Clause 19 and the New York
constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 20  However, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the Domestic
Relations Law does not violate the state constitution. As a
result, the court determined that there is no constitutional
protection affording same-sex couples the right to marry
under New York law.
21
The repercussions of this decision are significant.
Obviously one of the reasons that same-sex couples want to
marry is so that they, like opposite-sex couples, may
participate in marriage benefits. The benefits of marriage
are widespread; in fact, it is estimated that "[m]ore than one
thousand rights and responsibilities are automatically
accorded to couples based on marital status." 22 In 2004, the
GAO estimated that 1,138 federal statutes existed in which
marital status was a factor. 23  A number of states have
conducted their own studies and have found that while
"[s]ome of these rights and responsibilities can be
17 Id. at §50 (emphasis added).
18 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6.
'9 Id. New York's Due Process Clause states that "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
20 Id. New York's Equal Protection Clause states that "No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws of this State or any
subdivision thereof."
21 id.
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replicated partially by private agreements . . . most such
rights and responsibilities cannot.,
24
Laws affected by marital status cover almost every
aspect of life. For example, marital status affects family
law.25 Rights that automatically apply to married couples
include the right to seek spousal support, the right to seek
custody and visitation, the right to adopt, the duty to
support one's spouse, the liability for family expenses, and
the automatic coverage of spouses under most automobile
policies.26 Taxation is also affected by marital status.27
The GAO lists the right to file jointly and the right to
transfer property between partners without tax
consequences as rights automatically afforded to married
couples. 28  Health care laws affected by marital status
include the right to automatically have access to medical
records and the right to hospital visitation.29  Married
couples are also granted reciprocal rights to make funeral
arrangements, dispose of remains, and consent to organ
donation.3 ° Marital status also affects probate. 3' Marriage
automatically confers protection from disinheritance to
intestate succession. 32 Under tort law, married couples can
seek compensation for wrongful death and loss of
consortium.
33
Additionally, government benefits and programs
automatically afforded to married couples include
survivor's benefits and military benefits. 34 In the private
24Id. at 367.
25 Id.








34 Id. at 369.
6
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sector, automatic benefits for married couples include
eligibility for life insurance and disability insurance, the
right to take sick leave to care for a seriously ill partner, the
right to family health insurance, and the ability to roll over
a spouse's 401(k) or other retirement accounts.3 5  Real
estate law is also affected by marital status.3 6 Eligibility for
tenancy by the entirety, homestead rights, rent-control
protections, and exemptions from transfer taxes are
automatically afforded married couples. 37 Spouses can file
jointly under bankruptcy laws. 38  Spouses can file joint
petitions to immigrate under immigration laws.
39
Additionally, married couples have protections under
criminal laws, including the privilege not to testify against
a spouse and the protection of domestic violence laws. 0
These privileges and protections illustrate that
marriage comes with an "extensive legal structure that
honors and protects a couple's relationship, helps support
the family and its children through an unparalleled array of
rights and responsibilities, and privileges a married couple
as a single financial and legal unit."
41
Fortunately, a few benefits afforded married
couples have been granted to same-sex couples in New
York.42  In fact, three New York cases, two executive
orders, and an act passed by the New York legislature have
granted same-sex couples some rights and protections. In




38 Id at 370.
39 Id.
40 Id
41 Jon W. Davidson, Winning Marriage Equality: Lessons from Court,
17 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 297, 304 (2005).
42 See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee
on Lesbian and Gay Rights, Committee on Sex and Law, and
Committee on Civil Rights, Report on Marriage Rights for Same-Sex
Couples in New York, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 70, 76-77 (2004).
7
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Appeals declared that "the gay life partner of a tenant in a
rent-controlled apartment is to be considered a family
member under the rent control statute and entitled to
protection from eviction." 43 In another case, In re Jacob/In
re Dana, the Court of Appeals granted the right of "second
parent" adoptions to same-sex couples.44  The Court
explained that "second-parent adoptions can be granted
because they permit the creation of stable legal ties
between one partner and the biological or adopted children
of the other partner." 45  Additionally, in Stewart v.
Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., a
surviving same-sex partner was allowed to "honor his
deceased gay partner's preference for the treatment of his
remains, over the objections of the decedent's mother and
brother," despite a rule that "only the surviving spouse or
next of kin may determine disposition absent testamentary
directives to the contrary."
46
Additionally, two recent executive orders and an act
passed by the New York legislature granted New York
same-sex couples rights and protections. An executive
order, promulgated in 1983, prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation when "providing health
insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners of state
employees." 47 By 2001, health care benefits for same-sex
partners were made available to all state employees. 48 In
New York City, an executive order banning discrimination
based on sexual orientation was implemented.49  In
addition, the New York legislature enacted the Hate Crimes
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based on, among other things, discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
50
Despite the benefits that New York same-sex
couples have won, it is important to remember that none of
these rights were automatically afforded to same-sex
couples as they would be if same-sex couples could marry.
More importantly, while court decisions, statutes, and
executive orders may be able to grant same-sex couples
some rights, without recognition of their right to marry,
many of the benefits of marriage will remain unattainable
to same-sex couples. Therefore, it is clear that the
implications of decisions like Hernandez v. Robles are
momentous.
III. The Flawed Reasoning of the Hernandez
Majority
The majority's reasoning in Hernandez is flawed.
The majority uses an incorrect standard of review in both
its Due Process and Equal Protection analyses. By applying
the correct standard of review, the New York Court of
Appeals should have found that the Domestic Relations
Law violates the state's constitution. Therefore, under a
correct reading of New York's constitution, same-sex
couples should be allowed to marry, and the above-
mentioned rights should be automatically afforded to same-
sex couples.
A. A Rational Legislative Decision?
Although the focus of the Hernandez decision was
whether the Domestic Relations Law violates the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses, the Hernandez majority
first considered whether the challenged limitation could be
defined as a rational legislative decision. Because the
5oid.
9
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answer to this question is "critical in every stage of a due
process and equal protection analysis," 51 I will also begin
my analysis by exploring whether the challenged limitation
can be defined as a rational legislative decision.
In determining whether a there is a rationally related
government interest in a limitation, "[t]he crucial question
is whether a rational legislature could decide that [the
benefits of marriage] should be given to members of
opposite-sex couples, but not same-sex couples." 52  The
majority offers two justifications for conveying such
benefits to opposite-sex couples but not same-sex
couples.53 Both justifications are derived from the
supposition that marriage is important to the welfare of
children, 54 and both justifications are seriously flawed.
The majority's first argument is that "the
Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to
avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex
relationships. '"5 5  The majority explained that because
heterosexual intercourse can lead to childbirth, while
homosexual intercourse cannot, the legislature could
rationally decide that it should grant opposite-sex couples
the benefits of marriage, which creates stability in a child's
life.56  The majority then explained that the legislature
could rationally find that same-sex relationships are more
casual and more temporary than opposite-sex
relationships. 57 Thus, the legislature could conclude that
because "an important function of marriage is to create
more stability and permanence in the relationships that
cause children to be born," opposite-sex couples should be
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offered "an inducement-in the form of marriage and its
attendant benefits."
58
The majority's first argument is flawed for a
number of reasons. First, there is no evidence to support the
majority's assertion that opposite-sex couples have more
stable and less temporary relationships than same-sex
couples. In fact, this assertion indicates a misperception of
the gay and lesbian community in general and reflects a
bigoted and biased belief. Further, it is unjust and irrational
to place all homosexuals into a group as generally having
unstable and temporary relationships and then to base a law
on this generalization.
In addition, while it is true that homosexual
intercourse cannot lead to childbirth, it is also clear that
homosexuals can and do have children of their own. In
addition to having their own children, some same-sex
couples adopt children. Therefore, the majority's argument
that opposite-sex couples need or deserve the institution of
marriage because they can have children applies with equal
force to same-sex couples and renders the majority's
argument unpersuasive.
The majority's second argument is that "[t]he
Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other
things being equal, for children to grow up with both a
mother and father." 59 The majority explained, "Intuition
and experience suggest that a child benefits from having
before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what
both a man and a woman are like." The majority
concluded that this is a "rational ground[] on which the






61 Id. at 8.
11
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This argument is also seriously flawed. The
majority cannot believe that children will only be exposed
to male and female role models if their parents are in
opposite-sex relationships. Surely the majority would agree
that in addition to parents, people outside of a marital
relationship are also role models for children. Therefore,
while it may be true that an opposite-sex marriage would
automatically supply a male and a female "role model,"
male and female role models from outside of a same-sex
couples' marital relationship are still available to children
of same-sex couples. More importantly, even if parents
were the only role models available to children, there is no
reason to believe that having both a male and female parent
will automatically benefit children. Many would agree that
having two positive same-sex role models is better than two
negative opposite-sex role models. In such a case, the
welfare of a child would be better protected in a same-sex
home than an opposite-sex home.
Most importantly the majority rests its entire
argument on the incorrect premise that the function of
marriage is to promote the welfare of children. 62  The
function of marriage is not, nor has it ever been, to create
stable relationships for the benefit of children. While the
creation of stable relationships that benefit children is
definitely a product of marriage in many cases, the function
of marriage is not to promote the welfare of children.
Clearly not all couples marry to have and raise children. In
fact, there are many married couples who cannot have
children. In their case, the function of marriage cannot be
to promote the welfare of children. Additionally, many
couples are married for considerable periods of time before
they have children. Can the majority seriously make the
argument that the function of these childless couples'
marriages is to promote the welfare of children?
62 See id. at 7.
12
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Alternatively, if the function of marriage were
really to promote the welfare of children, then why not
reserve marriage for couples who have or intend to have
children? Even the majority would not suggest this,
because a rational argument could also be made that if the
function of marriage were really to promote the welfare of
children, homosexuals with children should be allowed to
marry as well.
B. Due Process and Equal Protection
Standards of Review
It is clear that the Hernandez majority's argument
that the Domestic Relations Law can be defended as a
rational legislative decision is flawed. This flawed
argument led the majority to conclude that the law is valid
under the New York Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. I will now explore the problems with the
Hernandez majority's Due Process and Equal Protection
analyses.
1. Due Process
When determining whether a right is properly
protected under the Due Process Clause, it is necessary to
64first define the right asserted. According to the
Hernandez court, the right asserted could be broadly
defined as "the right to marry" or narrowly defined as "the
right to marry someone of the same sex." 65 In determining
which "right" was at issue, the Hernandez majority looked
to the Supreme Court cases of Lawrence v. Texas and
63 Id. at 9.
64 See generally, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986).
65 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d. at 9.
13
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Washington v. Glucksberg.66  The Hernandez majority
claimed that these cases indicate that the "right" in question
should be defined narrowly as "the right to marry someone
of the same sex."
67
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that the right
in question should be defined broadly because a narrow
definition of the fight at issue would be arbitrary. 68 In
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held that the right in
question should be defined narrowly because "the narrow
definition of the right at issue was based on rational line-
drawing." 69  Based on these Supreme Court cases, the
Hernandez majority argued that the "right" at issue in that
case was more like the "right" at issue in Glucksberg; thus,
the majority concluded that the right should be narrowly
defined.70
The Hernandez majority erred in defining the
"right" asserted. A closer look at Glucksberg and
Lawrence indicates that the Hernandez majority should
have used Lawrence's broad definition rule rather than
Glucksberg's narrow definition rule. The right asserted
should have been defined as the "right to marry." This is
because Lawrence overturns Bowers v. Hardwick,71 a case
where the Court used a narrow definition to define the fight
involved.72 Bowers's treatment of the Due Process Clause
mirrors Glucksberg's in at least three important ways.
73
First, both Bowers and Glucksberg held that the court is to





70 Id. at 9.
71 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67.
72See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
73 See Brian Hawkins, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due
Process since Lawrence v. Texas, 15 MICH. L. REv. 409, 415 (2006).
14
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to recognize a new constitutional right., 74 Second, both
required a court to "define the proposed new right in the
narrowest fashion possible, usually as the right to engage in
an activity specifically forbidden by the statute." 75 Third,
both "treat[ed] past decisions declaring new substantive
due process rights as protecting no more than the specific
right declared, rather than reflecting some overarching
constitutional principle." 76  Given these important
similarities in Bowers's and Glucksberg's treatment of the
Due Process Clause, it is clear that when Lawrence
overruled Bowers's narrow definition of the right involved,
Lawrence also implicitly overruled Glucksberg's narrow
application test. Therefore, the Hernandez majority
ignored Supreme Court precedent in choosing the narrow
definition over the broad definition of the right involved.
Supreme Court precedent actually requires the court to use
the broad definition of the right involved--"the right to
marry"-over the narrow definition.
Under a Due Process analysis, once the right is
defined, the next question is "whether the legislation
restricts the exercise of a fundamental right."77 According
to the Supreme Court, a fundamental right is one that is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
78
Because the Hernandez majority defined the right involved
as "the right to marry someone of the same sex," the
majority argued the right at issue is not a fundamental
right.79  It explained that "the right to marry someone of
the same sex" is not "deeply rooted" in our nation's history






17 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citations omitted).
78 Id at 720-21 (citations omitted).
79 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d. at 9-10.
'° Id at9.
15
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However, if the majority had properly defined the
right involved as "the right to marry" it is clear that the
Domestic Relations Law clearly restricts a fundamental
right. For, as the history of New York marriage law
indicates, marriage is deeply rooted in history and tradition,
even though it has undergone widespread changes over the
years. 8 1 In fact, even the Hernandez majority conceded:
81 The history of marriage laws in New York is not static, but reflects
adjustment and change. Not only have the marriage laws themselves
changed, but the understanding of what marriage means has also
undergone regular transformation. In fact, "marriage has undergone
near-constant evolution to the point that marriage today bears little
resemblance to marriage in the past." See Suzanne B. Goldberg, A
Historical Guide to the Future of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 249, 251 (2006). For example, under the New
York Common Law, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
"the wife ... and her husband constitute[d] but one person." Id at 257.
This meant that once married, a woman's property and ability to
contract became her husband's. Id. In fact, in 1820, the Supreme
Court of Judicature stated, "no man of wisdom and reflection can doubt
the propriety of the rule, which gives to the husband the control and
custody of the wife." Id. at 258. However, "by the middle nineteenth
century, the institution of marriage had changed considerably." Id. In
1848, New York passed legislation allowing women to own property
independent of their husbands, and in 1849, the act was amended to
allow women to make contracts independent of their husbands as well.
Id. at 258-59.
In the 1850's and 1860's, New York passed the Earnings Act,
which "protect[ed] married women's savings deposits, ensur[ed]
married women the right to vote as stockholders in elections, and
protect[ed] a woman's right to sue and be sued and to keep her earnings
during marriage." Id. at 259. In 1908, New York Courts recognized
"the separate existence of a husband and his wife ... and [gave] to each
the same right and remedies." Id. at 260. The New York Courts also
struck down "[t]raditional requirements that a husband be joined to any
tort action against a married woman" and "recognized a married
woman's right to sue third parties for personal torts." Id. Soon after,
the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity under which "neither spouse
could sue the other civilly for injuries wrongfully inflicted upon the
other ... was written out of existence." Id. at 261-62. In 1954, the
New York Court of Appeals, "extend[ed] the abrogation of inter-
16
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"The right to marry is unquestionably a fundamental
right."
8 2
i. Due Process Under a Strict
Scrutiny Test
Had the Hernandez majority correctly defined the
right involved and correctly deemed the right to be
fundamental, the court should have proceeded under a strict
scrutiny test. This is because the Supreme Court has
determined that "classifications affecting fundamental
rights are given the most exacting scrutiny."83 Therefore, if
a fundamental right is restricted, a strict scrutiny test must
spousal immunity to include criminal cases so that husbands could be
convicted of larceny for theft of his wife's property." Id. at 262.
In 1958, the New York Court of Appeals upheld loss of
consortium rules, which traditionally allowed husbands but not wives
to recover for the loss of a spouse. Id. at 262-63. But the Court of
Appeals soon rejected this rule, holding that loss of consortium applied
equally to husbands and wives. Id. at 263. The doctrine of necessaries,
which held that "husbands, but not wives, were obligated to support the
family," was declared outmoded in 1989. Id.
In addition, "the treatment of sexual relations between spouses
as an element of marriage has also undergone significant change." Id.
at 264. Under the Common Law, "a man could have sexual relations
with his wife any time he chose," and the wife was presumed to have
given consent. Id. However, in 1984, the New York Court of Appeals
rejected this rule. Id.
Traditional rules regarding gender roles also changed. For
example, the Common Law rule that fathers "[were] entitled to the
custody of their children" was statutorily changed in 1860 to "grant[]
married women joint custody of their children." Id. at 266. By the late
1800's, the presumption that fathers should have the children "gave
way to a maternal presumption in child custody disputes." Id. at 267.
However, the New York Courts later declared: "[W]hile the role of
gender in making custody determinations has had a lengthy social and
legal history, it finds no place in our current law." Id.
82 Id.
" Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). See also, Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966).
17
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be applied. 84 When a strict scrutiny test is applied, the law
must "further a compelling government purpose" and
cannot be justified if there is a "less restrictive
alternative." 85 Under a strict scrutiny test, "the ordinary
presumption of constitutionality is reversed., 86 In such a
case, the government must show that there is a compelling
government interest in furthering the law or policy.
87
Applying the correct standard to the correctly defined right,
it is clear that the Domestic Relations Law does not further
a compelling government purpose.
The Hernandez majority defines the interest
involved as protecting the "welfare of children. ' 88 Under a
strict scrutiny test, the interest in protecting the welfare of
children must be compellingly furthered by the Domestic
Relations Law. As shown above, the Hernandez majority's
conclusion that the law is a rationally related legislative
decision is seriously flawed. The rationally related
legislative decision test is a lower threshold than the
compelling government interest test; therefore, it is clear
that there is not a compelling government interest in
limiting marriage to only opposite-sex couples.
Further, even if there were a compelling
government interest, there are less restrictive alternatives to
protecting the interest asserted. When determining whether
there is a less restrict alternative, the government has the
heavy burden of showing that the law is narrowly tailored
84 Clark, 468 U.S. at 461.
85 Regents of California v. Bakee, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972)).
86 OTIS H. STEPHENS AND JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOLUME II: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 28
(4tb Ed. Thompson Wadsworth 2008) (2003).
87 Id.
88 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
18
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to achieve the compelling government interest.89 Common
sense shows that there are several "less restrictive"
alternatives to advance the interests that the government
asserts. There are numerous ways to protect the welfare of
children without limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.
For example, to obtain the majority's goal of benefiting the
welfare of children through stable relationships, the state
could implement mentor or educational programs that teach
child-raising skills. For these reasons the Domestic
Relations Law cannot be justified under a strict scrutiny
test.
ii. Due Process Under a
Rational Basis Test
More importantly, even if the Hernandez majority
correctly defined the right involved and correctly deemed
the right to be non-fundamental, the reasoning would still
be flawed. This is because had the Hernandez majority
been correct in defining the right involved as "the right to
marry someone of the same sex" and had the Hernandez
majority been correct in defining the right as non-
fundamental, the law would still have to pass the rational
basis test.90 However, as explained above, the Hernandez
majority's argument that the Domestic Relations Law can
be defended as a rational legislative decision is flawed.
This means that even if the Hernandez majority was correct
in defining the right involved as "the right to marry
someone of the same sex" and even if the right is not a
fundamental right because there is no rationally related
government interest for limiting the right, the Hernandez
majority still should have found the Domestic Relations
Law violative of New York's constitution.
89 STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 86.
90 Id.
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2. Equal Protection
The same determination of whether to use a rational
basis or strict scrutiny test under the Due Process Clause
applies to the Equal Protection Clause. The Hernandez
majority again proceeded under a rational basis test when it
should have proceeded under a strict scrutiny test.
The Hernandez majority believed that the Domestic
Relations Law does not discriminate based on sex.91 It
explained:
By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples,
New York is not engaging in sex discrimination.
The limitation does not put men and women in
different classes, and give one class a benefit not
given to the other. Men and women are treated
alike-they are permitted to marry people of the
opposite sex, but not people of their own sex.
92
Finding no sex-based discrimination, the majority
proceeded under a rational basis test. This reasoning is
unsound. The Domestic Relations Law does discriminate
based on sex. It does not allow a woman to marry a woman
or a man to marry a man. Because of her sex, a woman is
not allowed to marry another woman, and because of his
sex, a man is not allowed to marry another man. In other
words, the sex of the individual seeking marriage
determines whether an individual will or will not be
allowed to marry his or her partner. This sex based
discrimination means that a suspect classification is
involved.
91 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10.
92 1d. at 10-11.
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i. Equal Protection Under a
Strict Scrutiny Test
When a fundamental right or suspect classification
is involved, a strict scrutiny test is applicable.93  As
mentioned above, the right involved, properly defined, is
the "right to marry"-a fundamental right. Additionally, as
explained above, the classification involved is suspect.
According to two constitutional experts:
Operationally speaking, strict judicial scrutiny
means that the ordinary presumption of
constitutionality is reversed; the government
carries the burden of proof that its challenged
policy is constitutional. To carry the burden,
government must show that its policy is "narrowly
tailored" to further that interest.
94
As mentioned above, the policy involved is neither
narrowly tailored nor does it further the expressed
government interest in promoting the welfare of children.
For these reasons, the Domestic Relations Law is
unconstitutional under New York's Equal Protection
Clause.
ii. Equal Protection Under a
Rational Basis Test
More importantly, even if there was no sex-based
discrimination, the classification must still pass the rational
basis test. In order to pass the rational basis test, the
Domestic Relations Law must be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. The Hernandez majority argued
that the legitimate state interest is to benefit the welfare of
9' See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9' STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 86, at 455.
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children. However, as explained above, this argument is
unreasonable.
A classification does not meet constitutional muster
under a rational basis test, if (1) the purpose of the
challenged discrimination is an illegitimate state objective,
and (2) the means employed by the state are not rationally
related to achievement of the objectives. 95 In other words,
"where individuals in the group affected by the law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to the interest the
State has the authority to implement," the law passes
muster under the rational basis test;96 otherwise, it does not.
As mentioned above, there is no rational basis for such a
law; therefore, there is no rational basis for the
classification, and the law does not even pass the rational
basis test.
97
C. Alternative Standard of Review:
Intermediate Scrutiny
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that even if a strict
scrutiny test were not applied, an intermediate scrutiny
analysis would also be appropriate. 98  Intermediate
scrutiny "generally has been applied to discriminatory
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy." 99  The
Supreme Court has held that "[t]o withstand intermediate
scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially
related to an important governmental objective."'
00
The majority recognized that "[t]hose who prefer
relationships with people of the opposite sex and those who
prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not
treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may
9' Id. at 454.
96 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11 (citations omitted).
97 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (citations omitted).
98 Id. at 10.
99 Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
100 Id.
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gain the status and benefits associated with marriage."'
01
Despite this recognition, the majority argued that there was
no gender-based discrimination in restricting same-sex
couples from marrying because the Domestic Relations
Law "does not put men and women in different classes, and
give one class a benefit not given to the other."'
10 2
According to the majority's rationale, "[w]omen and men
are treated alike-they are permitted to marry people of the
opposite sex, but not people of their own sex." 03
However, the majority misconstrued intermediate
scrutiny. The purpose of applying intermediate scrutiny to
gender-based classifications is to bar the government from
discriminating against an individual based on his or her
gender. By barring same-sex couples from marrying, the
state of New York is clearly barring individuals from
marrying based on their gender. The state is saying, for
example, that because an individual is a woman, she cannot
marry another woman, and because an individual is a man,
he cannot marry another man. This is discrimination based
on gender classification.
When discrimination is based on gender
classification, the intermediate scrutiny test applies, and the
"proffered justification [must be] exceedingly
persuasive.' 0  As noted above, the majority's proffered
justification for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples
is unreasonable. An unreasonable justification cannot be
"exceedingly persuasive;" therefore, the Domestic
Relations Law does not pass intermediate scrutiny either.
101 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11.
1021d. at 10.
'03 Id. at 10-11.
104 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1995).
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IV. Conclusion
The reasoning of the Hernandez majority is flawed,
and the repercussions of this flawed reasoning are grave.
Many benefits of marriage remain unavailable to same-sex
couples because their right to marry has not been
recognized. Same-sex couples are left with few options
with respect to gaining benefits that are automatically
afforded to married couples. Same-sex can wait for the
Court of Appeals of New York to overrule its own decision
or wait for the Supreme Court of the United States to take a
case and declare laws barring same-sex marriage to be in
violation of the United States Constitution, options which
are not likely in the foreseeable future. Alternatively, they
can convince the New York legislature to overturn the
Domestic Relations Law and grant same-sex couples the
right to marry under a new law. At this point, however, it
seems that their best bet is to petition the courts for
individual benefits, as has already been done in several
cases. Additionally, same-sex couples can lobby for
executive orders and other acts to protect their rights. Such
efforts, however, will never give same-sex couples the
array of rights that are automatically afforded to opposite-
sex couples when they enter into marriages. More
importantly, many rights are unattainable without the legal
ability to marry. Therefore, without a favorable decision by
the courts, it is unlikely that same-sex couples will receive
the benefits of marriage they deserve.
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